Olympus may face delisting from exchange


Finally, the **** has hit the fan...

The company has been rotten for a while now, and now that this scandal finally broke, something good will come out of it.

There will be buyers for sure... the medical division is still one of the better selling brands globally, and I am sure one of their competition or a Chinese company will make a bid for it at the quickest time... The camera division will hopefully be absorbed by a compatible company like Panasonic who have the same interests as Olympus... But would be really funny if Kodak or Fujifilm makes a bid... or forbid!!! Nikon/Canon! ha ha ha... but I am sure whoever owns the company will have a lot of fun in building this company again... the strong engineering and crap pack of lying thieving execs have to go... finally the engineers found freedom!
 

I am skeptical of Kodak making the bid, as Kodak may ruin m4/3 and 4/3 development as they are cash scrapped but a better distribution channel to North America. Fujifilm may not gain much other than know-how to build the bodies (they themselves have great lenses in the first place).

Panasonic may be the better partner to buyout the imaging division, but the synergy would be mainly the development of the pro bodies and the lense optics. Distribution wise I doubt it would help.

I am skeptical of a Chinese company making a bid, as I feel (feeling hor, an opinion) that they would not improve on the quality. I heard that the lenses of the 4/3 system are not that well built, although the quality of the optics is up there.
 

I am skeptical of Kodak making the bid, as Kodak may ruin m4/3 and 4/3 development as they are cash scrapped but a better distribution channel to North America. Fujifilm may not gain much other than know-how to build the bodies (they themselves have great lenses in the first place).

Panasonic may be the better partner to buyout the imaging division, but the synergy would be mainly the development of the pro bodies and the lense optics. Distribution wise I doubt it would help.

I am skeptical of a Chinese company making a bid, as I feel (feeling hor, an opinion) that they would not improve on the quality. I heard that the lenses of the 4/3 system are not that well built, although the quality of the optics is up there.

The CEO of Kodak is a F.U.C.KER. He rides on a private airplane, while the company burns.
 

Finally, the **** has hit the fan...

The company has been rotten for a while now, and now that this scandal finally broke, something good will come out of it.


I would not be so hopeful.

Having ALREADY ADMITTED TO FRAUD. I think de-listing is 99.9% sure thing.

Facts are: Fraud for more than 2 decades. Amounts to more than US$1.5 billion.

Also Olympus debts are 5 times equity. At present the costs of Olympus corporate bonds(mkt) borrowing had gone up 9 times due to the scandal.

All we know is the medical division had a good mkt share but whether it is profitable or not this last decade is another thing as the books had been cooked for so long.

A bankruptcy sale is only a matter of time. There is absolutely no compelling reason for the camera division or the Olympus name to remain/survive.
 

If Olympus delists the average shareholder loses. It would be preferable to fine them heavily, jail all the key culprits, renew the management team and institute a medium term strict supervision.

In parallel legislation in Japan needs to be changed as to how companies should be managed, audited and regulated as I don't believe Olympus is the only Japanese company which has done this.

Also do also note as per this article, that most of the past losses have been resolved by 2008.

The Japanese will do things differently from the western world whether we like it or not.
 

Seems like GIC already dumped their shares. Very fast.

UPDATE 3-Olympus dumped by major shareholder as Japan steps up probe | Reuters

In the same article, it says:
Nikkei reported separately, quoting sources, that a majority of the 100-plus businesses acquired during former Olympus President Tsuyoshi Kikukawa's tenure are losing money.

Didn't know Olympus has so many other businesses. :confused:
 

Is that why their OLympus 12mm m43 lens is over $100? Money suckers.

"GIC disposed of almost all of its investments on first suspicion of possible wrongdoing in Olympus," the Singapore fund said in a statement.

"on first suspicion" being the keyword. No need to think, suspicion translate to guilty straightaway. Not surprising or unexpected really.
 

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Here's a good article on the whole bloody matter:

Corporate Japan Rocked by Scandal at Olympus
By HIROKO TABUCHI
TOKYO — In June 1998, a disturbing rumor tore through trading floors in Tokyo: Olympus had suffered colossal losses on derivatives trading, punching a large hole in its balance sheet. The company’s shares spiraled down 11 percent in three days.

But Olympus categorically denied the rumor and went on to post record profits. All was well in the house of Olympus, the newly installed president, Tsuyoshi Kikukawa, assured investors.

That story came back to haunt the company this week after a shocking revelation, prompted by accusations by Michael Woodford, its ousted British chief executive turned whistle-blower: The company admitted it had hidden losses from the early 1990s using a series of inflated acquisition payments of over $1 billion, much of it made through obscure overseas funds, in a bid to clear its balance sheet.

Mr. Kikukawa has resigned in disgrace as chairman, along with two of his lieutenants, and could face criminal charges over the cover-up if securities laws were violated, analysts say. The company has lost three-quarters of its value, faces the possibility of delisting from the Tokyo Stock Exchange and may have a large financial hole to climb out of after all the losses are accounted for.

The Tokyo Metropolitan Police has begun an investigation into the cover-up, people familiar with the matter said Thursday. The investigation is led by the section of the force that handles financial crimes, and it will focus on charges of aggravated breach of trust, the people said, speaking anonymously because they were not authorized to speak with the media.

A Tokyo police unit that handles organized crime is also involved with the investigation, the people said. Media reports have suggested that Olympus worked with people with links to the Japanese mafia to help set up the transactions that masked losses.

The scandal is rocking corporate Japan not least because of the company’s succession of firings, denials and admissions; it is also certain to expose weaknesses in Japan’s financial regulatory system and corporate governance, analysts said.

Analysts also warned that more Japanese companies could be hiding losses they incurred in the country’s asset-and-stock-price bubble economy of the late 1980s. Companies routinely poured billions of yen into speculative trades — moves called “zaitech,” or “financial techniques” — that turned sour when the bubble burst in 1990.

“This has been two lost decades for corporate accounting. It’s easy to imagine companies hiding losses for years, waiting for financial markets to recover,” said Hideaki Kubori, a lawyer in Tokyo who specializes in corporate governance and compliance. “But the recovery never came.”

Exporters like Olympus were especially eager to prop up their earnings to counter a surge in the value of the yen after 1985, which crimped overseas profit.

“In that era, companies found they could make more money investing in land or stocks than you could in your main business,” said Hiroshi Osano, a professor at the Institute of Economic Research at Kyoto University.

But after the bubble burst, Japanese companies entered a painful decade of writing off losses. “Those that dealt with the problem straightaway struggled through the 1990s and pulled through,” Mr. Osano said.

The losses Olympus incurred, however, appear to have been so big that the company decided some finessing was in order. It was an enthusiastic investor in derivatives and other risky investments under Toshiro Shimoyama, president from 1984 to 1993, who told the Nikkei industrial daily newspaper in 1986: “When the main business is struggling, we need to earn through zaitech — though doing too much is no good.”

Though it is still unclear how, and how much, Olympus lost from its bubble-era investment spree, there are hints of excessive risk-taking. Until 1990, returns on investments propped up its profit; by 1991, it had written down 2.1 billion yen in securities valuation losses, the first of many write-downs.

In September 1998, three months after the rumors of the colossal trading losses, Olympus said it had written off part of a 45 billion yen investment in emerging market bonds. In its midterm earnings statement in October 1999, the company said it had booked a loss of almost 17 billion yen from trades including interest rate and currency swaps. The company also recorded a loss on a 2.9 billion yen investment in what turned out to be a Ponzi scheme run by the New Jersey firm Princeton Economics International.

Those write-downs, however, were the exception, not the norm, and Olympus now admits that it hid investment losses; a third-party panel of legal experts is still assessing how much.

“It is possible that if Olympus had booked all its losses, it would have become insolvent,” said Tsutomu Yamada, a market analyst at Kabu.com Securities in Tokyo. “So Olympus management decided to handle the losses off the books. They did it for the sake of the company.”

Although Olympus has not detailed the system by which it hid the losses, the local news media have speculated that it used a once common maneuver known as “tobashi.” In tobashi, translated loosely as “to blow away,” a company hides losses on bad assets by selling those assets to other companies, often dummies, only to buy them back later.

That allows the company with the bad assets to temporarily mask losses, said Mitsuhiro Fukao, a finance professor at Tokyo’s Keio University. Tobashi was banned in the early 2000s.

Tobashi was made infamous by Yamaichi Securities, which hid over 200 billion yen in losses. Yamaichi collapsed in 1997. It was Olympus’s preferred broker.

“The idea is that you pay off the losses later, when company finances are better,” Mr. Fukao said. “If this was the case at Olympus, the payments it made would have been made to finally settle” the loss, he said.

Olympus appears to have pushed to settle its tobashi dues from 2006 to 2008, when the local economy was picking up and corporate profits rebounding. “Business was finally strong enough to be able to foot a write-down,” said Mr. Osano at Kyoto University.

It was during those years that the company engineered the payouts that have come under scrutiny: $687 million in fees to an obscure financial adviser over Olympus’s acquisition of the British medical equipment maker Gyrus in 2008, a fee that was roughly a third of the $2 billion acquisition price, more than 30 times the norm.

Olympus also acquired three small Japanese companies from 2006 to 2008 with little in common with its core business for a total of $773 million, only to write down most of their value within the same fiscal year.

But at the end of 2008, the global financial crisis plunged companies into the red. Olympus booked a 115 billion yen loss in the fiscal year that ended in March 2009. Its loss attracted little attention, however, alongside equally dismal numbers from other struggling manufacturers.

With that taken care of, Olympus appeared ready to start a new chapter, said Mr. Yamada of Kabu.com. The chief executive who publicized the payments was promoted, he said, “to focus on growing the company. They did not expect him to start digging into the past.”

Experts now warn that Olympus faces a tough future. Depending on the size of its losses, the company could even fall into insolvency, warned Akira Ohira, an analyst at the credit research firm Tokyo Shoko Research.

“If the company is hiding even more losses that it is forced to book, it could soon run into severe financing problems,” Mr. Ohira said. “Right now, banks do not like the fact that the size of total losses is unclear.”

With such a sharp drop in its market value, Olympus could also become the target of takeovers by rivals, said Kabu.com’s Mr. Yamada. “Its endoscope business is highly successful, and there could be a bidding war.”

Executives involved in the cover-up are likely to be prosecuted if violations of securities and company laws are suspected, said Tatsuo Uemura, professor in securities regulation and corporation law at Waseda University.

“Olympus’s actions go far beyond a simple fudging of numbers. They used all sorts of schemes, acquiring firms and paying advisers,” he said.

The fallout from the scandal could also extend to auditors, who will need to explain why they failed to noticed such big losses for so long, Mr. Fukao said.

“You just can’t hide hundreds of millions of dollars in losses on your balance sheet, and for so long,” Mr. Fukao said. “There would have been signs. More people should have known.”

And it is likely that other companies will be suspected of similar behavior. “It will be hard to prove to foreign investors that Olympus is the only one,” Mr. Yamada said.

Martin Fackler and Taro Umemura contributed reporting.

In short, anyone who followed Olympus for over a decade would have remembered that incident. On what might happen, I think here's my take:

1. The company will and will always be Japanese. The main shareholders are Japanese banks (typical for any major Japanese company), and the Japanese government is unlikely to allow a foreign takeover.
2. The company might be forced to downsize and concentrate on medical and may even go as far as offload the imaging unit, especially if it is loss making.
3. Olympus will likely exist in some form, even if it is absorbed by some other Japanese companies.
 

:o

Latest news:

Now there is another US$4.9 billion still unaccounted for and it seems some of these billions missing is tied to the Yakusa/Mafia:


"Olympus paid a total of 481 billion yen, or $6.25 billion, through questionable acquisition payments, investments and advisory fees from 2000 to 2009, according to the memo, but only 105 billion yen has been written down or otherwise accounted for in its financial statements. That leaves 376 billion yen, or $4.9 billion, unaccounted for, according to the memo."



Billions Lost by Olympus May Be Tied to Criminals

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/18/business/global/japanese-police-investigate-olympus.html

November 17, 2011
Billions Lost by Olympus May Be Tied to Criminals
By HIROKO TABUCHI

TOKYO — Japanese officials say that at least $4.9 billion is unaccounted for in a financial scandal at Olympus and are investigating whether much of that money went to companies with links to organized crime.

In a memo prepared by investigators and circulated at a recent meeting of officials from Japan’s Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission, the Tokyo prosecutor’s office and the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department, officials say they are trying to determine whether Olympus worked with organized crime syndicates to obscure billions of dollars in past investment losses and then paid them exorbitant sums for their services.

The memo — a copy of which was obtained by The New York Times from a person close to the official investigation — appears to link the Olympus losses for the first time to organized crime groups.

It also suggests that investigators believe illicit payouts from Olympus went far beyond the roughly $1.4 billion in merger fees and acquisition payments that have come under recent scrutiny, potentially making it one of the biggest scandals in Japanese corporate history.

Olympus, a maker of medical imaging systems and digital cameras, recently announced that an internal investigation had found that the company used a series of money-losing acquisitions to hide investment losses in the 1990s, keeping those losses off its books for decades. Olympus has said a panel of third-party experts is still tallying numbers on how big the losses were.

The company has said that all the transactions went toward masking losses. It has denied rumors that it sought the aid of Japan’s notorious organized crime syndicates, known as the yakuza, to help orchestrate a cover-up.

But according to the investigators’ memo, Olympus made payments amounting to many times the losses it sought to hide, and investigators suspect much of the additional money went to crime groups.

Olympus paid a total of 481 billion yen, or $6.25 billion, through questionable acquisition payments, investments and advisory fees from 2000 to 2009, according to the memo, but only 105 billion yen has been written down or otherwise accounted for in its financial statements. That leaves 376 billion yen, or $4.9 billion, unaccounted for, according to the memo.

The memo says investigators believe that over half of that amount has been channeled to organized crime syndicates, including the country’s largest, the Yamaguchi Gumi. The memo does not make clear whether Olympus knew about those links. But if confirmed by investigators, an association with organized crime could prompt a delisting of Olympus shares from the Tokyo Stock Exchange, under the exchange’s rules.

The memo suggests that Olympus may have been coerced by organized crime syndicates that knew about or helped with previous cover-ups to channel ever-increasing funds out of the company.

“Olympus was exploited over its cover-up totaling losses of 50 billion yen, and since 2000, over 200 billion yen has disappeared into the underground economy,” the memo said.

Olympus officials said Thursday that they had no immediate comment. On Oct. 26, when asked about the possibility of the involvement of “antisocial forces” in the scandal, a euphemism for organized crime, the president of Olympus, Shuichi Takayama, said, “I absolutely do not recognize this.” So far, three Olympus directors have been dismissed or have stepped down.

Questions were first raised about Olympus’s acquisitions in August in the Japanese magazine Facta. The scandal deepened in October after Olympus fired its chief executive, Michael C. Woodford, who said he was dismissed after questioning the company’s chairman and board about some of the payments.

Mr. Woodford said Thursday that he planned to return to Japan next week to speak with the authorities about the investigation. Mr. Woodford has also been cooperating in the United States with the F.B.I. and the Securities Exchange Commission, which are looking into the matter, as well as in Britain with its Serious Fraud Office.

At the heart of Olympus’s action is a once-common technique to hide losses called tobashi, which Japanese financial regulators tolerated before clamping down on the practice in the late 1990s.

Tobashi, translated loosely as “to blow away,” enables companies to hide losses on bad assets by selling those assets to other companies, only to buy them back later through payments, often disguised as advisory fees or other transactions, when market conditions or earnings improve.

The Japanese investigators’ memo chronicles Olympus’s efforts to pay off its previous losses through payments camouflaged as acquisitions and supposedly related advisory fees to buy companies that seemed to have little relation to its main business.

The memo confirms some information previously reported by The New York Times, which found that deal payments were largely made by the management consulting firm Global Company, headed by Nobumasa Yokoo, a former banker at the investment bank Nomura.

Also helping to arrange those deals, according to those news reports and the investigators’ memo, was ITX, a company acquired by Olympus in 2003 and formerly headed by Mr. Yokoo’s elder brother, Akinobu Yokoo.

The investigators say that in December 2005, ITX bought Tsubasa Net, a software maker, which the memo calls “a front company” known by the Japanese police to be affiliated with the Yamaguchi Gumi. ITX’s earnings report for that year shows it paid 16 billion yen ($208 million) for that acquisition.

Meanwhile, Olympus, being advised by Global Company, paid 73.4 billion yen ($953 million) to acquire three Tokyo-based companies — Altis, Humalabo and News Chef — between 2006 and 2008, and then quickly wrote off the investments. The memo identifies all three as front companies with links to organized crime.

And in 2008, when Olympus acquired the British medical equipment company Gyrus and paid 68.7 billion yen ($892 million) in adviser fees partly to a company incorporated in the Cayman Islands, some of those fees were transferred to investment funds with organized crime links, the memo said.

Neither Olympus nor the Yokoo brothers have been charged with crimes, but people with knowledge of the investigation who were not permitted to discuss it publicly say the Japanese authorities — including police, prosecutors and financial regulators — are pursuing possible offenses that include false accounting and aggravated breach of trust.

Akinobu Yokoo is president of an aviation parts and services company, Jalux, which said on Thursday that Mr. Yokoo would not be available to comment.

The Tokyo offices of Global Company were cleared out in early October.

At another company owned by Mr. Yokoo, a man who identified himself only as “Yamamoto” said Mr. Yokoo had not been seen “for some time” and had given instructions “not to speak to outsiders” about Olympus.

No one answered the doorbell at his registered home address in Tokyo, a tiled mansion fitted with tall fences and security cameras.
 

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